How Democracies Die:
- Nihan Iscan
- Aug 16, 2023
- 2 min read
By: Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt
Page number: 231
Originally published: January 2018
"It is an idea which hasn't been disproved yet, a song the words of which have not gone bad." (pg. 231)
Dr. Levitsky and Dr. Ziblatt have observed a shift in the way democracies experience breakdowns around the globe. While democracies were immobilized by blatant dictatorships before, their breakdown has been more unobtrusive in recent years.
Before, democracies commonly failed in a manner that was easy to spot. The authoritarian figure usually got into power via an abrupt and violent strike. The regime declared itself the only force, the constitution was openly disregarded, and courts shut down. This manner of political despotism is undisguised.
In recent years, however, the decline of democracies has not been with the classic coup d’etat. Now, democracies experience breakdowns at the hands of elected officials who begin to turn against the very system that brought them to power. There is no show of violence, the elections continue, and the authoritarian leader usually claims to be democratic. Commonly, it takes years for the general public to notice that the leader who insisted that he be the one to protect democratic values is the same leader who executed all his power against it. Although the institutions still seem to be in place, the democratic government ceases to function under such a leader.
In the book, the authors observe what causes a democracy to fail and what elements are essential for its existence. The book focuses on Trump’s presidency and the danger he possessed to the US democracy. It compares the circumstances of past democratic failures to the political stance of the US in 2018. It shares insight into what the authors call the "guardrails of democracy". It reminds the reader that the US is not immune to the threats of authoritarianism, and the growing extremism and polarization might be deadly for our democracy.
Chapter 1: Fateful Alliances
"willingly handing over the keys of power to an autocrat- in- the- making"(pg. 13)
Fateful alliances are what the authors refer to as the collaboration of an outsider autocrat-to-be with the insider political elites. It is often the first step down the road of dictatorship; a devil's bargain. In such situations, the insider political elites openly give support to the outsider autocrat-in-the-making, either in times of distress or for personal benefits. The insider's endorsements open the door for the dangerous figure to enter the world of politics and allow him to gain the legitimacy he had been yearning for. Although the insiders think they can tame the autocrat after using it to their advantage, the autocrat does not give up power when the time comes.
Such alliances commonly occur in times of distress where the country can't come to a majority agreement or when the political elites fear losing office. The distressed political insiders who fear losing their seats choose what they see as the lesser of two evils, deciding on getting public support through supporting an autocrat- to be over losing office and preventing the rise of the harmful figure. Instead of prioritizing the survival of democracy and with it applying gatekeeping techniques, they support the suspicious outsider figure with large public support. Unfortunately, the general public can't always spot an autocrat, especially in the face of severe challenges. At times, the public roots for the one who offers easy but democratically harmful solutions to big problems. It is more important for the political elites to have a firm democratic understanding than for the general public. Moreover, people's association with democracy is not proportionate to how they get ruled. For example, although Chile is more democratically administered than Venezuela, public surveys show that 53% of Chileans versus 60% of Venezuelans think that democracy is the best form of government.
The contradiction here is a showcase that the obligation to safeguard democracy is not at the public's call: it is at the hands of the political elites. The political insiders are responsible for noticing the suspicious figures and preventing their rise to power.
THE LITMUS TEST
But how should the insider political elites know an autocrat is one without seeing him in the very act of abusing power? What are the warning signs that give away a hidden anti-democratic leader? Well, the authors created a comprehensive litmus test for identifying anti-democratic politicians. There are four categories in the test, and if the outsider tests positive in any of these four, it is a must to use gatekeeping tactics to keep him away from gaining political strength.
(page 23)
DISTANCING
When a rising politician is seen to be undemocratic, "distancing" should be used against them. Distancing is when the parties see an extremist politician who threatens democracy and "isolate and defeat" the figure in five steps.
Here is distancing in its essence;
1) The party must keep the said figure off the party ballots, even if involving him could bring in more votes.
2) The party must eliminate the supporters of the extremists no matter their ranks, even if it costs the party to lose manpower.
3) Democratic parties must avoid alliances with suspicious figures/ extremists, even if they seem to ideologically be closer to the extremists than the Democratic opposition party.
- It is dangerous if "a party's greater affinity for extremists on its side of the political spectrum than for mainstream parties close to the opposite side" (page 25)
4) Parties must systematically isolate rather than legitimize the extremist, even if he could benefit the party members.
5) If the suspicious figure becomes a serious electoral contender, the mainstream parties must unite against the extremist for the survival of democracy, even if the mainstream parties are ideologically different from one another.
EXAMPLES
ITALY ;1922
Unsuccessful gatekeeping: King Emmanuel the Third, searching for a solution to ease the wide public unrest, called Mussolini, a popular rising fascist, and offered him the head of government position. Elite political insiders, such as Giovani Giolitti, applauded the economic changes that came with Mussolini's appointment to office and disregarded the danger he was to Italy's functioning government. Although many politicians believed that Mussolini, a figure who received the support of street thugs and formerly held 35 out of 535 seats in the parliament, could be restrained, the following years showed that was far from the truth. Mussolini was given legitimacy and recognition by the political insiders who underestimated an extremist's position of power. He ruled Italy in absolute totalitarianism for the next twenty years.
SWEDEN ; 1933
Successful gatekeeping: The Swedish Conservative Party (AVF) was a right-wing mainstream party in Sweden. AVF had a Youth Group Organization called the Swedish Nationalist Youth Organization that had 25000 members. The organization was growing extremist in the years of Hitler's rise and supported radical views. The AVF knew that maintaining the organization would legitimize them and give power to their extremist ideals. In 1933, the AVF expelled the organization completely. The gatekeeping caused the party to lose 25000 people who formerly worked and voted for the party. The AVF prioritized the value of democratic rule over their party's disposition at the elections and did their part in sustaining the Swedish democracy.
GERMANY ; 1933
Unsuccessful gatekeeping: The German government collapsed in 1930 amid the Great Depression. The far-right was busy with their problems. In the absence of strong, democratic candidates, Nazis and Communists grew in popularity. Paul von Hindenburg, using the constitutional right to choose a chancellor without the need for election during times of crisis, chose Heinrich Bruning, Franz Von Papen, and lastly, General Kort von Schleicher to be the chancellor of Germany. All failed to gain majority agreement and public support, which pushed the political insiders to appoint Hitler due to his popularity. Von Papen disregarded the worries of Hitler's leadership, saying that they will get rid of him in two months once the public is rested. History shows that he could not have been more wrong.
BELGIUM ; 1936
Successful gatekeeping: Mainstream parties of Belgium during the 1930s encompassed the center-right Catholic Party, Socialist Party, and Liberal Party. There were two popular far-right extremist parties named Rex Party and the Flemish Nationalist Party who supported radicalism. The Catholic Party saw that the extremist parties' voter bases would be a tremendous support for them if they publicly endorsed the two parties. The Catholic Party and the two extremist parties were all strongly Catholic, however, the extremists lacked democratic understanding. The Catholic Party did not lose track of the importance of democratic certainty and cut all ties with and publicly delegitimized the extremists.
VENEZUELA ; 1992
Unsuccessful gatekeeping: Rafael Caldera, the former president who began to lose public support, endorsed Hugo Chavez in the public eye, aiming to rise back to his old glory using Chavez's popularity. He supported Chavez in his speeches and even took him out of prison. His support allowed Chavez to take a permanent seat at the office.
Chapter 2: Gatekeeping in America
"The real protection against would be authoritarians has not been American's firm commitment to democracy, but rather, the gatekeepers- our political parties." (pg. 37)
America is not devoid of extremists, not even close. In the 1930s alone, 800 right-wing extremist groups existed. America overcame extremists due to its strong gatekeeping culture. Although the American public gave support to radicals at times, the parties did not allow those figures to climb up the political ladder, at least not until 2016.
Gatekeeping is the parties' prevention of autocrats from attaining power, even if the public endorses the said figure. In a way, it is an undemocratic way of maintaining democracy. What the founding fathers attempted with gatekeeping was to establish "a balance of dual imperatives". On one hand, choosing a popular candidate by the will of people, and on the other, keeping out demagogues by filtering them out. This balance has not always been perfectly established in America.
AMERICAN EXTREMISTS FROM THE PAST
Father Charles Coughlin was an anti-Semitic Catholic priest whose radio program received 40 million people audience. He had a newspaper publishing titled Social Justice which received a considerable amount of subscribers. He was openly anti-democratic and supportive of fascist ideals. Despite his radical views, a big group of Americans advocated for him.
Huey Long was a Louisiana governor and senator who openly disvalued the Constitution. He used anti-democratic tactics against state legislature, judiciary, and press. His Share Our Wealth line received 27000 cells. His autocrat-like behavior did not stop some from supporting him.
Alabama Governor George Wallace was a white supremacist who played into the white working class's sense of victimhood. He encouraged violence and openly disregarded the Constitution. He flamed the growing racial hatred in his audience. He was highly supported by the public and at a certain point became a serious contender in the Democratic primaries.
Lastly, Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy was one of the most applauded extremists to emerge in American politics. He went against the very idea of democracy by delegitimizing his rivals using red-baiting tactics, abusing fear of communism to his benefit. He attempted to subside the government institutions and officials, claiming they were under communist influence. By addressing his opponents as traitors who don't qualify to be in the electoral race, McCarthy presented them as a threat to the very existence of the US. He suggested that there is no alternative to him and his ideas. To him, his opponents' victory would mean the demolition of America as we know it. He was an autocrat in the making because he put his party's victory above American democratic values. Unfortunately, McCarthy was popular among the American public. Polls showed that half of the American population approved of him. The term McCarthyism is still used to describe using anti-communist hysteria for party gains.
Fortunately, democracy survived despite the emergence of these extremists, not because of Americans' firm commitment to democracy but because of the gatekeeping parties.
GATEKEEPING IN AMERICA THROUGH THE YEARS
The Electoral College was the original gatekeeper. Initially, only locally prominent men, the electing local notables, voted for the president in each state. However, the emergence of parties gave the choosing right to party loyalists.
In the early 19th century, the Congressional Caucuses began in which the presidential candidates were chosen by groups of congressmen. After the 1830s, a similar system called the Convention System was in play. Both systems contained the infamous "smoke-filled rooms" in which political insiders selected the presidential candidates. The built-in screening system allowed the democratic insiders to prevent popular extremists from running for president. Demagogues such as Henry Ford, George Wallace, and Lindbergh were prevented from obtaining power. However, on the other hand, the "smoke-filled rooms" did not give the primary choosing power to the public, which to some was undemocratic.
In 1968 gatekeeping changed form. It was the turning point to a system with binding presidential primaries. With this change, the parties' leaders no longer chose the candidates, now it was the right of the voters. State-level primaries and caucuses allowed the general public to elect anyone who ran for office. The screening test that detected extremists was no longer in place and the elections were open to anyone. Although this new system seemed more democratic, it also lacked sufficient gatekeeping. One can't refuse but to ask: "Might this new way be too democratic that it damages democracy itself?"
Chapter 3: The Great Republican Abdication
The lack of susceptible gatekeeping in choosing presidential nominees has made it more susceptible for outsiders with money and influence to enter the elections. With the increased availability of outside money and media coverage, outsiders can politically rise without necessarily getting the approval of party insiders. Although it may seem that this provides a more fair ground for people to run for office with equal representation, it also increases the chances of an autocrat- in the making to gain power.
Donald Trump's presidency is an example of how gatekeeping lacks sufficiency in today's America. Although Trump proved to be an extremist and tested positive in the litmus test for all four categories, there was no one to stop him from rising. It is partly due to the new system and partly due to what the authors referred to as a "collective abdication". In this chapter, the authors discuss how GOP representatives continued to advocate for Trump in hopes of gaining benefits from his rise to power. They abandoned their obligation of gatekeeping to serve their party, a deadly mistake for democracy.
TRUMP'S LITMUS TEST RESULTS
1) Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game:
- Trump delegitimized the federal government in 2016 elections by questioning the validity of the election results in the case that he lost.
2) Denial of the legitimacy of one's opponents:
- Trump delegitimized his opponents, e.g: blamed Obama of not being American, and called Hilary Clinton a criminal.
3) Toleration or encouragement of violence:
- In his rallies, Trump encouraged violence, telling his supporters that he will cover the legal aspects of their violence if they initiated it.
4) Readiness to curtail the civil liberties of rivals and critics:
- Over the years, Trump repeatedly threatened to punish free media.
COLLECTIVE ABDICATION
GOP did not take the necessary measures for Trump, an evidential extremist. They collectively disregarded democratic values by advocating for an anti-democratic leader through two beliefs: fateful alliances and party polarization. First was the false sense that they could use Trump to get to the highest office, and tame him according to their desire. As already discussed in Chapter 1: The Fateful Alliances, it always ends in turmoil when parties/ figures support an autocrat thinking that he can be controlled after reaching power. Second is an ideological collision; because the mainstream parties in America are intensely polarized, the conservative party's agenda may have looked more similar to Trump's agenda, rather than the Democrats'.
An exemplary gatekeeping model would be if the GOP dismissed Trump, regardless of how many votes his presence would bring to the party, and endorse his opponent Hilary Clinton. Surely, it is hard to imagine such a scenario amid the growing tensions between opposing parties. However, such a reaction by the Republicans would be the most democratic approach.
Chapter 4: Subverting Democracy
"the very defense of democracy is often used as a pretext for its subversion"(pg. )
Although there is no single blueprint for democratic breakdown, there are striking similarities that the authors have collected from all around the globe. In this chapter, they explain how, in common, elected autocrats subtly undermine democratic institutions in three steps.
OVERTHROWING DEMOCRACY
To consolidate power, autocrats complete three steps:
1) capture the referees
2) sideline other side's star players
3) rewrite the rules of the game
The first step in an autocrat's playbook is capturing the referees. Referees are the neutral arbiters who are responsible for preventing corruption. They are the judicial courts, law enforcement bodies, tax regulatory agencies, and other governmental institutions. An autocrat wants to use the power of the neutral arbiters in favor of his regime. If the said institutions are filled with loyalists, they can be used as a shield and a weapon against any opposition. Usually, an autocrat does this by quietly firing non-partisans and replacing the spots with loyalists.
Prime Minister of Hungary, Minister Viktor Orban's 2010 rulings is a good example of this step in practice. Orban expanded the size of the Constitutional Court from 8 to 15 judges and filled the new positions with his men. Orban did not disobey any rules by the letter of the law, however, he went against the spirit of it. The new Constitutional Court was not acting as an unbiased judicial force but as a security agency for Orban's regime.
The second step is to ensure that the opposition's key players are sidelined. The autocrat attempts to subjugate opposition figureheads- politicians, businessmen, and chiefs of media outlets. He will ask for their support or at worst their quiet neutrality. For example, in Fujimori's Peru, the media was a campaign platform for him. Fujimori bought off the critics, and every Peruvian media aired what the administration told them to.
Contemporary autocrats battle the opposition figureheads under a veil of legality. In 2009, Turkiye's Erdogan baselessly fined the Dogan Yayin Media 2.5 billion dollars for tax evasion, forcing the company to sell its newspaper and TV outlets. Erdogan sidelined an opposition media platform under the public eye because he was able to cover it with a legal procedure.
The third step is to rewrite the rules of the game: shifting the constitution or chagning the democratic norms. A good example of this is the United States Civil War. Between 1885 and 1908, all the post-confederate states reformed their state electoral laws to harden the African American voting process. They did this to put the opposition at a disadvantage.
TIMES OF CRISIS
A combination of an emergence of a crisis and an autocrat can have devastating effects on democracy. A crisis creates room for the leader to overstep his boundaries and be left unchecked. Commonly, the public gives more support to their leader during a crisis, creating "a rally around the flag". People want their leaders to have increased power to fix the situation. Such an environment is perfect for the autocrat, as it allows him to act undemocratically and justify it to the world. For this reason, there have been many examples around the globe where the autocrat creates the crisis himself, often using violence.
Erdogan's administration took advantage of times of crisis repeatedly. For example, in 2015, Erdogan's party, AKP, lost its parliamentary majority. The elections were followed by ISIS attacks that swiftly pushed the public to root for the popular party. Just five months after the elections, the government held another round, in which Erodgan regained control of the parliament by popular vote. A year later, in 2016, he declared a state of national emergency after the coup attempt, completely overstepping the democratic lines. There were persecutions on massive scales: more than 50,000 arrests. Even after the coup, the government campaigned to maintain a state of fear and anxiety within the public. A year later, still benefitting from the crisis created by the coup, Erdogan removed all checks on presidential authority.
Chapter 5: The Guardrails of Democracy
"The written rules work best when they are reinforced by the unwritten rules of the game" (pg. 101)
Constitutional rules are general guidelines and don't address every possible situation. Even well-designed constitutions are not capable of maintaining democracy by themselves. Take the Weimar Constitution of 1919; while many considered it preventative of governmental abuse, it could not tame Hitler. However, American democracy was preserved for two centuries. If not the Constitution, to what then does America owe its democratic continuance? The answer is the "unwritten democratic norms". Their strong development within the political circle is fundamental for democracy.
UNWRITTEN RULES
Unwritten democratic rules should be widely understood and applied in government. These norms should not be left to the good character of the politicians, rather they should be common knowledge. When such norms are not followed, there should be definite disapproval from all sides of the political spectrum. There are numerous unwritten democratic norms, but according to the authors, the two most crucial ones are "mutual toleration" and "institutional forbearance". The norms go hand in hand because politicians show institutional forbearance when they tolerate their rivals.
Mutual Toleration:
- "even if we believe our opponents' ideas to be foolish or wrong- headed, we don't view them as an existential threat" (pg.102)
Mutual toleration is the understanding that long as the political opponents are constitutional, they are legitimate rivals. In this understanding, the rivals don't pose an existential threat to the survival of the nation. They are capable of competing for power and governing.
Institutional Forbearance:
Institutional forbearance is restraint in the exercise of power. For the political competition to continue, politicians must not use their legal power to the hilt. Showing a degree of restraint is necessary for the continuation of the existing order. Within this understanding, politicians must avoid actions that are respective to the letter of the law but violate its spirit.
For example, for the majority of American history, the two-term presidency limit was not a constitutional law, it was a norm of forbearance. Meaning, presidents legally were able to run for a third term in office, however, they did not use this legal power to its limit and gave up power after two terms. This norm became law only after F. D. Roosevelt was re-elected in the 1940 elections. The violation of such a strongly embedded norm triggered a response to pass the 22nd Amendment.
The opposite of forbearance is a politician's exploitation of legal power, referred to as "constitutional hardball". This is when the politician is not acting to keep the democratic game going and is only concerned about winning the round: "playing for the keeps". Although his actions are still within the bounds of legal code, they oppose the spirit of it.
An example of constitutional hardball is when the South introduced new legislation regarding voting. It required all voters to provide certain faculty for them to vote. These requirements were, for the most part, not possessed by the African American community. Although the new legislation did not go against the letter of the constitution, it went against the spirit of it. The Southern congressman did not apply norms of institutional forbearance and damaged the existing system.
Chapter 6: The Unwritten Rules of American Politics
RACE IN POLITICS
"the norms that would later serve as a foundation for American democracy emerged out of a profoundly undemocratic arrangement: racial exclusion" (pg. 125)
From America's birth till the turn of the twentieth century the formerly discussed unwritten rules, mutual toleration, and institutional forbearance were fragile due to partisan disagreement. Their complete disintegration happened during the Civil War caused by disagreements on racial equality. The farm owners in the South saw African- Americans' right to freedom as a threat to their financial security, while the North saw racial inequality to be unacceptable.
The Civil War ended, and during the Reconstruction Era, when Andrew Johnson was the president, the 14th and 15th Amendments that granted African Americans the right to safety and suffrage passed. The South, while having to confine by these new amendments, also received certain compromises by the federal government to create their state laws regarding African- Americans without the Union's supervision. After these compromises were made that allowed the South to create the Black Codes, the parties were able to move forward. The tensions between them subsided and the unwritten rules were beginning to form again at the expense of racial equality.
This state of tranquility between the parties -at the cost of racial exclusion- lasted till the birth of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. The acts brought racial inclusion and fully democratized the country. However, with democratization came challenges against mutual toleration and institutional forbearance.
THE DELICATE BALANCE
"For our constitutional system to function as we expect it to, the executive branch, Congress, and the judiciary must strike a delicate balance." (pg. 126)
American democracy has three branches: legislative, judicial, and executive. The legislative is the Congress -House of Representatives and the Senate-, the judicial is the Supreme Court and federal and state courts, and the executive branch is defined by the president and the cabinet. All of these branches must show a level of self-restraint when it comes to using their powers.
The legislative and judicial branches have the power to oversee the executive branch. The system can only function when they use their powers at a balance. Legislative and judicial branches must be watchdogs of democracy, containing the president when it is necessary. On the other hand, they must not overuse their ability to check the president, they must show institutional forbearance for the democratic game to continue.
If this intricate balance is disturbed there are two possible outcomes, in neither one can democracy survive. First is if the legislative and judicial branches are in the hands of the opposition, and the institutions that were supposed to be watchdogs become attack dogs. In this case, the non-executive branches use constitutional hardball to overuse their power. "Defunding the government, blocking all presidential judicial appointments, and perhaps even voting to remove the president" (pg. 126) are examples of constitutional hardball. Second is if the non-executive branches are at the hands of the president's party, they stop checking the president, allowing him/her to overuse their power. It is referred to as the unified government, and in this case, the non-executive branches turn from watchdogs to lapdogs.
FORBEARANCE IN PRACTICE
1) PRESIDENT
The American presidency is a "potent" position due to the US Constitution's lack of specification on presidential rights. The President can issue executive orders without needing consent from Congress. It has powers to override Congressional and Judicial decisions, use the presidential pardon on others and himself
The deeply embedded forbearance culture within the presidential position was first established by President George Washington. Washington showed a great deal of self-restraint when it came to using his almost limitless presidential capabilities. He was willing to sign treaties that went against his judgment at times.
Following Washington's footsteps, almost all US presidents showed similar forbearance. Harry Truman, for example, agreed on Supreme Court's block on the 1952 executive order. Dwight Eisenhower did not go against the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education ruling his disagreement with the decision. Richard Nixon turned in the tapes wanted by the Supreme Court despite his reluctance.
With the turn of the 20th century, the already powerful position of the presidency has gotten even more dominant due to the vastly growing military that called for "concentrated power" to manage such a complex establishment. However, this did not give way to abuse of power by the presidents because of the preservation of forbearance culture.
2) SENATE/ CONGRESS
Like the US President, US Senate has significant power that it can use to check the other branches of government. The use of forbearance in the Senate is as crucial as in any other division for the continuation of democracy. Two important powers that the Senate holds are filibustering and advice over presidential appointments. First, the filibuster is Senate's ability to prolong the debate on any legislative discussion. Second is the Senate's ability to block the president's choice of appointees to his cabinet and justice department. These two powers must be used with careful forbearance. The Senate has two traditional values related to forbearance: courtesy and reciprocity. Courtesy is "avoiding personal or embarrassing attacks on fellow senators; reciprocity is "entailed restraint in the use of one's power so as not to overly antagonize other senators and endanger future cooperation". Both of these norms provide a sense of unity and healthy opposition within the Senate.
Congress has many rights of which the heaviest is the right to impeach the president. Our Constitution does not make it hard for Congress to impeach a president. If the impeachment is without conviction, it requires a majority vote in the House of Representatives. If impeachment is invented with conviction and the removal of the president, it requires 2/3 of the vote in the Senate. Despite having the right to impeach the president, Congress does not use this power ordinarily.
UNWRITTEN NORMS UNDER THREAT
Here are three examples of when norms of institutional forbearance and mutual toleration were under threat:
1) F.D. Roosevelt:
During Great Depression and WW2, FDR wanted to stay in for a third term and increase the number of judges at the Supreme Court to use to his advantage.
He neglected norms of forbearance and, fortunately, received bi-partisan opposition.
2) Joseph McCarthy:
Using fear of communism in the public, McCarthy delegitimized his opponents by suggesting they were communists.
He was neglecting mutual tolerance and, unfortunately, received some support from the far right.
3) Richard Nixon:
Used hard propaganda against his opponents, claiming they were a threat to the nation and the existing order. He wanted to make an intelligence program for the opposition.
He was neglecting mutual toleration, and fortunately, he received bi-partisan opposition.
Chapter 7: The Unraveling
"the idea that the country they grew up in is "slipping away, threatened by the rapidly changing face of what they believe is the "real" America."" (pg. 174)
In 1994, Republican representative Newt Gingrich was elected to be the Speaker of the US House of Representatives. Gingrich was one of the first Republican models to encourage the abandonment of democratic norms of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance in the party. After winning the Georgia elections, he began to encourage his supporters for intolerant and violent behavior against Democrats. Gingrich also openly questioned his opponents' sense of patriotism. GOP adopted a "no compromise" attitude under his leadership. The 42nd President, Clinton, was impeached without bi-partisan majority and received an unusual number of filibusters by the Senate. As mentioned in the previous chapter's summary, this was an example of how the non- executive branches that are under the opposition party's leadership turned from watchdogs to attack dogs, preventing governmental function.
Newt Gingrich left the position in 1999, however what he helped start in the Republican Party only grew stronger in the following years. With Obama's admittance into office, GOP made it a habit to abandon the unwritten democratic norms.
First, throughout Obama's presidency GOP commonly used filibuster to reject all offered orders. This forced the president to use the "nuclear option" of having to pass overreaching executive action and eliminating the filibuster with Democratic Party's support. In 2011, for example, in what is called the federal debt limit crisis, the Senate held the debt limit hostage to gain demands from the president.
Secondly, GOP was repeatedly denying Obama's nationality and patriotism. They did this not only by campaigning about it, but also showed it in foreign relations. For example, in 2015, Tom Cotton along with 46 other GOP Senator wrote to Iran's leaders that Obama did not have authority to make deals with them on behalf on the US nation.
Thirdly, GOP showed no sign of institutional forbearance when it denied the President's nominee judge, Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court. This kind of lack of forbearance have rarely been seen in the US history, and proved the extent to which the party was in denial of the democratic norms.
GOP DURING OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
During Obama's presidency, the Republican Party began an absolute enmity toward the administration. The party began to exploit the sense of loss and anger shared by its supporters who experienced "status anxiety", referring to the reaction adopted by a group whose sense of status, identity, and belonging are perceived to be threatened. The Republican base looks at certain governmental and cultural changes as a danger to their status quo. They see their values, historical upbringing, and traditions to be under attack.
There is increasing partisan animosity in the US caused by the strictly defined differences between parties. Democrats are in considerable amounts liberal and migrant, while Republicans are white Protestants at large. Voters are almost divided by racial, religious, and geographic differences. It becomes easier to feel existentially threatened by the opposition when they have physical differences from you.
Republicans, or the white Protestant population, were the electorate majority for two hundred years in the US. Due to migration, they are now the minority and are decreasing over time. This is making the party afraid of losing their dominance and pushes them to have aggressive and intolerant conduct. They leave norms of forbearance and mutual toleration with such feelings.
This polarizing atmosphere poses imminent dangers for our democracy. Without unwritten democratic norms valued and in practice, the US democracy is doomed to fail. Thus it must be in all of our best interests to try to reinstall those values in our political and cultural systems.
Chapter 8: Trump against Guardrails
"Even if President Trump does not directly dismantle democratic institutions, his norm breaking is almost certain to corrode them." (pg. 193)
In Chapter 4, the authors share three steps an authoritarian figure takes to gain power; capturing the referees, sidelining the key players, and rewriting the rules. Trump attempted all three; here's how.
Governmental institutions are unbiased, non-partisan organizations that work independently to establish order; they are the natural arbiters of the system. Trump has tried to get these institutions to be unlawfully loyal to him.
In his first week in office, Trump had dinner with FBI Director James Comey, intending to get him to work in favor of Trump in the "investigations into his campaign's Russia ties" (pf. 177), but Comey refused. Later, Trump fired Comey, the first time a president fired a director before the ten-year term was up in the history of the FBI.
When US Attorney Preet Bharara's investigations of money laundering threatened Trump's inner circle, he tried to establish a personal relationship with him. Bharara continued the investigation, and eventually, the president removed him.
The 9th Circuit of the US Court of Appeals initially blocked Trump's travel ban, and later the same court blocked the "withholding of federal funds from sanctuary cities" (pg. 179). Trump threatened to break up the circuit and questioned the legitimacy of the judges in it.
In 2017, Trump pardoned Joe Arpaio, a sheriff charged with racial profiling. Trump did this without the approval of the Justice Department, which is a right that the presidents have but rarely use. Trump showed no self-restraint of his powers, lacked acts of mutual toleration, and attempted to capture the referees.
When a leader is not democratic, he will see opposition as an existential threat rather than a political objector. Trump attempted to delegitimize his opponents in the public eye, creating a dangerous ground of polarization and mistrust. He did this by trying to shift the rules of the democratic game.
Trump accused most trusted media outlets, like New York Times and CNN, of airing untruthful information, calling them "enemy of the American people" (pg. 181)
In 2017, Trump began to use government benefits against his opponents on a larger scale. He signed an executive order to not give federal funding to cities that refused to obey the administration's "crackdown" on undocumented immigrants. In other words, he attempted to defund the areas where people did not show support for his administration.
Trump administration created the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, run by Kris Kobach. The administration claimed to need such a commission due to voter fraud in the US. Trump repeatedly delegitimized the US national electorate, saying it was frauded. In 2016, Trump claimed he had won the popular vote if the illegal votes were not counted. His attempts to delegitimize the voting system were immensely dangerous in pushing people to doubt the electorate. What the Commission pushed for was chillingly similar to the Jim Crow laws in the South. It increased the measures of voting identification to the advantage of the Republican Party. As we have discussed, Democrats have a large number of poor minority voters who have a higher chance of not having ID. Republican voters, majority white natives, are more likely to carry such identification cards. These measurements aimed at keeping out the Democrat votes.
Overall, Trump was not able to completely shift the way our politics work; however, he did force us to enter a zone that was less democratically secure than before. Senator Moynihan observed, "What was once seen as abnormal becomes normal"; what we now see - Trump's lack of understanding and practice of unwritten democratic norms, wanting to capture the referees, sideline the key players, and rewrite the rules of the game- may be abnormal, but, the nation's exposure to them will make us believe that they are the standard. Democracy is a sensitive concept and we must not take it for granted. Even seemingly insignificant steps in the opposite direction of democracy should be enough to ring alarm bells in our system and immediately attempt to redo the situation. Guardrails of democracy should always be in place to prevent Trump-like figures from acquiring and abusing power.
Chapter 9: Saving Democracy
"Few societies in history have managed to be both multiracial and genuinely democratic. That is our challenge." (pg. 231)
The authors explain that democratic leaders' attitude when opposing an authoritarian can save or break democracies. Levistsky and Ziblatt shared two critical elements the opposition must regard when dealing with an autocrat: adhering to democratic institutions and building strong coalitions.
The first key takeaway from this chapter is that undemocratic leaders should be fought in democratic ways. "Where institutional channels exist, opposition groups should use them." (pg. 217) This way, the value and trust in democracy's institutions will strengthen.
Protecting democracy by dirty fighting, on the other hand, will result in a pyrrhic victory. A radical way of opposition will scare away the moderates and prepare the grounds for the authoritarian to justify his dictatorial behavior. Even if opposition wins and the authoritarian is removed via undemocratic manners, it will only fuel the polarization between groups, and make it harder to secure democracy.
Venezuelan politics is an example of how significant the opposition's attitude is in acquiring long-lasting democracy. During Hugo Chavez's initial years as president, his opponents saw signs of an authoritative figure. The opposition wanted to take Chavez out of the presidency by any means necessary. They attempted a failed coup in 2002, later began a general strike and sought Chavez's resignation, and lastly, in 2005, they boycotted legislative elections. None of these were resilient to change the course of events. On the other hand, it decreased the trust and value people had in democratic leaders and gave Chavez an excuse to gain total control of government institutions. These undemocratic reactions gave him a warranty in the public eye to jail and exile other opposition, shut down all free media outlets, and "purge the military, the police, and the courts" (pg. 216).
Another example is Colombia, however in this case, the democratic opposition followed democratic fighting strategies, and fortunately, the results were victorious. Opponents of President Alvaro Uribe were focused on using courts and Congress to prevent Uribe's authoritative behavior. This way, Uribe had no room to make the public doubt the democratic objectives of the opposition and was forced to give up office democratically.
The second key takeaway is that democracy's continuation requires not only the coalitions of like-minded people but also the coalition of groups with opposing views. These coalitions will be able to set aside differences of opinion for the moment and prioritize the protection and preservation of democracy. "We must lengthen our time horizons, swallow hard, and make tough concessions." (pg. 219) Doing this will bring a wider circle of people into a democratic togetherness that will benefit the entire nation. Bringing together demographically, racially, religiously, and opinion-wise different people will remove hostility and intense polarization of today's atmosphere.
CONCLUSION
As discussed in Chapter 6, America faced a Civil War caused by disagreements regarding racial exclusion. During the Era of Reconstruction, the federal government made compromises to the South that jeopardized black people's rights; but in turn, re-installed the norms of mutual toleration and institutional forbearance.
Currently, the Republicans are against the new face of Democrats- non-native, non-white, non-Protestant- and don't want this face to represent what was once an all-white America. If Democrats slowed down or abandoned their agenda benefitting minorities, women, and migrants, it would mean less polarization between the parties and restoration of the unwritten norms. But it would also mean a repetition of the horrible mistakes the country once signed up for during Reconstruction. Thus, we have a challenge, a challenge that calls for hard work and constant deliberation to create a society where the "multiethnic democracy" is secured and the political, social, and economic equalities are truly for all.
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